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Some Comments on the Implementation of the
OEC Declaration on International
Investment and Multinational Enterprises.
Palitha T. B. Kohona*
1. Introduction
The OECD1 Declaration on International Investment and Multinational
Enterprises of 19762 was largely a response to pressures exerted by
various groups to bring the activities of multinational enterprises under
a greater degree of regulation for the benefit of the many interested
parties, including such enterprises. These pressures were generated by
groups amongst whom were those who sought greater control over
multinational enterprises which dominated certain wide areas of economic
activity, by national governments which sought to achieve economic and
political objectives by doing so, by those who resented the enormous
powers that multinationals wielded internationally and nationally, by
those who believed that there was something intrinsically abhorrent in
the concentration of political and economic power in the hands of small
groups and other such parties. Consequently, different interest groups
from diverse backgrounds for disparate reasons united in the task of
seeking a greater degree of regulation over multinationals. At one point
it was possible to discern a degree of collaboration among a motley group
of less developed countries which sought to control the economic
activities of multinationals and to harness their resources for the
benefit of the former, of other countries which sought to control them in
order to curb their economic and, hence, their political power, of groups
in developed and developing countries who were motivated by
considerations of economic nationalism and of groups that sought goals of
social and political justice and viewed multinationals as an essential
impediment to the realisation of such objectives.
However, despite the existence of numerous groups that sought to
control multinationals, it is to be emphasised that the activities of
multinationals were not without ardent defenders. The multinationals
themselves, the governments of countries in which they are based,
proponents of private enterprise and such other interested parties, who
were to be found mainly in the developed countries, belonged to this very
influential category. Their objective was to protect the interests of
multinational enterprises and create a better environment for the
expansion of their activities.
The sentiments of the developing countries on this matter were
clearly articulated in the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States.3 Chapter 2 of the Charter stated:
Economic Rights and Duties of States:
Article 1. Every State has the sovereign and
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inalienable right to choose its economic system as
well as its political, social and cultural systems in
accordance with the will of its people, without
outside interference, coercion or threat in any form
whatsoever.
Article 2.(l) Every State has and shall freely
exercise full permanent sovereignty, including
possession, use and disposal over all its wealth,
natural resources and economic activities.
(2) Each State has the Right:
(a) To regulate and exercise authority over
foreign investment within its national jurisdiction in
accordance with its laws and regulations and in
conformity with its national objectives and
priorities
(b) To regulate and supervise the activities of
transnational corporations within its national
jurisdiction and take measures to ensure that such
activities comply with its laws, rules and regulations
and conform with its economic and social policies ....
(c) To nationalise, expropriate or transfer
ownership of foreign property, in which case
appropriate compensation should be paid by the State
adopting such measures, taking into account its
relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances
that the State considers pertinent ....
These sentiments express a general desire on the part of developing
countries to acquire a degree of control over their natural resources and
over organisations (multinationals included) which are involved in the
development and exploitation of these resources.
Largely in response to the above pressures exerted by the groups that
sought to control multinationals, the United Nations Committee on Trade
and Development established a committee to formulate appropriate codes of
conduct for multinationals. (An International Code of Conduct on the
Transfer of Technology4 and The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable
Principles and Rules for the control of Restrictive Business Practices 5
were its achievements.) Despite its task being made extremely difficult
by the almost irreconcilable differences that existed among the various
countries represented in this Committee, it has completed its functions
to a large extent. This is a major achievement for the Committee. The
Non-Alligned Countries indicated their position at the Lima Sessions of
the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations.6
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The Andean Common Market adopted "The Common Regime of Treatment of
Foreign Capital and of Trade-marks, Patents, Licences and Royalties,"
amending and codifying Decision 24 of the Andean Pact Commission of 31
December 1970.7 The Organisation of American States proposed
"Behaviour of TNEs Operating in the Region and Need for a Code of Conduct
to be Observed by Such Enterprises."8 The European Parliament adopted
the draft proposal for a "Draft Code of Principles for Multinational
Enterprises and Governments." 9
Similarly, the Governing Body of the International Labor Organisation
has agreed to a "Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy."10 Within the framework
of the United Nations, a Code of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises is
being negotiated. The United Nations Economic and Social Council is
working on an international agreement to prevent corrupt practices in
connection with international commercial transactions.
As is indicated by the above endeavours of a variety of international
organisations, numerous efforts have been undertaken internationally over
the last decade with the objective of introducing some degree of
regulation over the activities of multinational enterprises and these
efforts have encompassed the different aspects of their operations.
2. The Need for International Action
It would seem that there is a general acknowledgment that since
multinational enterprises operate on a global basis, and since their
operations span numerous national boundaries, any effort to regulate
their activities, if it is to be done effectively, will have to be
undertaken primarily on an international basis, for it will be necessary
to involve all interested States in such a venture. (This explains the
reasons for the involvement of international organisations like the
UNCTAD, the ILO, the ECOSOC and the OECD in this matter.) Once States
have agreed internationally to a particular regulatory regime, it will be
necessary to require them to give effect to such commitments
internationally as well as within their national boundaries. This is
essential if the regulation that is sought to be achieved is to be fully
effective. It is also necessary to ensure that the rules which are
agreed upon on an international basis are enforced with regard to
multinational enterprises (who are subject to municipal jurisdictions) in
a broadly similar manner in the different countries.
Internationally binding norms could be created in a number of ways.
One of the most popular as well as effective methods is through the
conclusion of an appropriate treaty.11 In addition, it is now accepted
that international norms may be created for their member states by
international organisations. (The nature of such norms will depend on
the constitutional instruments of these organisations). The methods
employed by them for this purpose include decisions made by the
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appropriate organs in the prescribed forms, codes of conduct sponsored by
them, treaties drafted by them and duly ratified by the parties, etc.12
However, certain initial difficulties are required to be overcome
before such internationally binding norms can be created and effectively
implemented. Firstly, it is necessary to ensure that the norms are
created not only in compliance with accepted procedures (which might
include lengthy investigations, studies, debates, negotiations, adherence
to stated voting procedures, etc.) but also in a manner that would ensure
effective implementation by the states-parties concerned.
At present there is no universally accepted method for making norms
for international persons in a manner that would ensure effective
implementation. This is due to the fact that sovereign States (who are
generally the subjects of international norms) are still in a position to
avoid complying with any norm due to the absence of effective
international enforcement procedures. Compliance with international
norms is still largely left to the voluntary actions of the parties
themselves. (This is not to say that there are no legal and non-legal
measures that might be adopted to achieve this end at least to some
extent.)
The most effective means for ensuring due compliance with
international norms of conduct would appear to be to enact such norms
with the consent (acquiescence) of the relevant countries themselves.
This procedure normally involves prolonged negotiations and consultations
among the interested states-parties in a variety of committees,
sub-committees and other such fora where numerous trade-offs are obtained
and compromises secured in order to achieve formulae that are acceptable
to all the relevant parties. A formula that is acceptable to all such
parties could normally be expected to be voluntarily implemented (though
not necessarily) by them. Thus, giving such norms a degree of actual
effectiveness. (This method is widely used by international
organisations.) However, even after a commonly acceptable formula has
been devised, it might still have to be given an acknowledged legal form,
like being expressed in the shape of a decision or being included in a
treaty or code. The latter may have to be formally ratified.
Secondly, a State which has agreed to be bound by such an
international norm will be required to give effect to its international
obligations within its municipal legal system with the assistance of its
internal legislative, administrative and judicial organs. This is very
important in the case of norms which are designed to have an effect on
internal laws, customs and practices and on the lives of individuals, for
unless this is done, the norm in question might very well become
ineffective internationally as well. Giving effect to such a rule of
conduct in the internal legal system is normally not an easy task as
internal legislatures, which are responsible for making municipal laws,
are not necessarily controlled by the executives who were responsible for
negotiating the international accords. It is conceivable that they would
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be under the influence of the various national pressure groups which may
or may not be sympathetic to the accords arrived at internationally. It
will also be necessary to contend with administrative and judicial
officials who are ultimately responsible for enforcing internal laws and
who could be expected to be governed by their own prejudices and
pre-conceptions based on idelogy, history, culture, economic and social
factors and other such influences.
Hence, when an international rule of conduct is formulated, it might
be necessary to take the requisite precautions to ensure that it will be
eventually implemented by municipal authorities. This might necessitate
the draftsmen to ensure that when such a norm is formulated, it be
reflective, not only of the wishes of the relevant states-parties, but,
sometimes, also of the significant pressure groups within countries as
well. (In the case of a norm on multinationals this might include
pressure groups representing the multinationals themselves,
environmentalists, groups representing the right of free enterprise,
groups seeking greater economic justice, etc.) If these requirements are
not met, a norm of conduct painstakingly formulated and adopted might end
up being ineffective, both internationally and within municipal legal
systems.
3. The OECD Declaration
The OECD, whose membership consists of a selective group of
twenty-four developed countries13 and whose economic policies and
performance affect not only Member countries but also most nations
participating in the international economic system,14 proceeded to
conclude its own set of Guidelines15 for the relevant states-parties
and the multinationals. These consist of a Declaration1 6 with an Annex
attached to it and three Decisions17 (of the OECD Council) which are
treated as complementary and interconnected.
It was stated in the 1979 OECD Review of the 1976 Declaration and
Decisions18 that,
The aim of the Declaration was to promote
strengthening of co-operation among Member countries
in the area of international investment and
multinational enterprises through inter-related
instruments (dealing respectively, with Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises, National Treatment for
firms under foreign control and International
Investment Incentives and Disincentives) which
together were seen as constructing a balanced
framework within which the OECD countries would
organise their co-operation and consultation on issues
relating to international investment and multinational
enterprises. It was further foreseen that continuing
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endeavours within the OECD might lead to the
conclusion of additional international arrangements
and agreements in this field. 19
Broadly speaking, it could be said that on the one hand, the OEM
Declaration20 sought to introduce some form of regulation for
multinationals and, on the other, it hoped to create a better environment
for them to engage in their activities.
4. The Implementation of the Declaration
and the Decisions Internationally
The OED Declaration presents a number of difficulties in its
implementation - both internationally and internally. It is significant
that the Declaration and its Annex, 21 which are the main instruments,
contain very few mandatory provisions and they rely primarily on general
principles and exhortations to States and enterprises. This
characteristic poses some serious questions relating to the binding
nature and effect of the Declaration.
Furthermore, the Guidelines state in Article 6 that the "observance
of the guidelines is voluntary and not legally enforceable." Thus, from
the outset we are faced with a statement which has the effect of
depriving the Declaration of the effectiveness that some of the parties
who sought a greater degree of control over multinationals would have
wished to have conferred on it.
However, it might still be argued that the very fact that the OECD
decided to formulate the Declaration was indicative of a genuine desire
among the Member countries (perhaps, even with the concurrence of the
multinationals themselves) to introduce some form of regulation and to
create a better environment for the multinational enterprises and the
host countries - even though initially their efforts were to lack legal
force. In actual practice, the inclination appears to have been to give
effect to the Declaration as far as possible.
The 1979 Review of the Declaration concludes in paragraph 7:
The basic conclusion to which the review of
experience with the Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises presented in Chapter I leads is that the
Guidelines offer an efficient and realistic framework
for further encouragement of the contribution which
multinational enterprises can make to economic and
social progress and for the reduction and resolution
of the difficulties to which the operations of
multinational enterprises may give rise. Member
governments have indicated that on the basis of
available information there is a general willingness
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on the part of MNEs to observe the Guidelines. Even
So, more time and continued efforts by governments and
by business are needed for the Guidelines to become
more widely known and for their contents to become an
increasing part of day-to-day management practice.
The Committee considers that experience to date has
underlined the value of the Guidelines and that their
further promotion would be best served by providing
enterprises with a stable framework. For these
reasons, the Committee proposes that only one change
be made to the Guidelines at this time in order to
cover an issue that was not foreseen when the
Guidelines were drafted.22
In addition to the Declaration itself, at present there are three
Decisions of the Council of the OECD (in their currently revised form)
which are parallel instruments to the Declaration.23 It is possible to
state that they occupy a different legal position to the Declaration.
Under Article 5 of the OECD Convention, the Organisation may make
decisions which, except as otherwise provided, shall be binding on all
Members. (Thus, prima facie, they would be different in their effect to
the provisions contained in the Declaration.) Therefore, it may be said
that the Decisions of the Council at least will have a binding quality.
They are also important in that they deal with certain matters which are
of great significance to the Member countries - i.e., among other
matters, they require the Committee on International Investment and
Multinational Enterprises to be responsible for holding exchanges of
views relating to the principles contained in the Declaration on a
regular basis, require Member countries to notify the Organisation of
measures constituting exceptions to "National Treatment" relating to
"Foreign-Controlled Enterprises" and require consultations to take place
in the Committee where a Member country complains that its interest may
be adversely affected by the impact on its flow of international direct
investment by measures taken by another Member. It will be seen that
these decisions are also important in another respect in that they might
be instrumental in conferring an added significance to the Committee on
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises and might enable
it to evolve as a useful institution serving the objectives of the
Declaration. Furthermore, the decisions continue to emphasise the stress
that has already been placed on consultations and co-operation in the
Declaration itself as a means of achieving the objective of regulating
multinationals. However, despite its lack of extensive legal force at
present, it is quite possible that the Declaration, in due course, might
acquire a status that would confer on it a greater degree of legality.
5. The Effect of International Pressure
on the Implementation of the Declaration
One of the factors that has been utilised to lend force and effect to
the Declaration is international pressure. It may be said that there is
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a high degree of moral pressure on the members of the OECD and on
multinationals to abide by the principles contained in the Declaration.
After all, the Declaration was accepted voluntarily by the Members (and
was adopted with the acquiescence of all the Members except Turkey which
abstained) after extensive investigations, consultations and negotiations
in response to widespread pressure generated within the Member countries
and in the international community. It was also the result of extensive
trade-offs and concessions. The Declaration has created certain
expectations, both in the international community and among interested
pressure groups within countries, and the non-observance of the
principles contained therein could diminish the faith that might exist in
the minds of the relevant parties. It would also generate adverse
publicity for the OECD and its Members. Hence, it could be argued that
today there exists a high degree of moral pressure on States and on
multinationals to abide by the principles contained in the Declaration
and this factor could be significant in interested parties' giving full
effect to them. (In recent times moral pressure has on occasion been
used effectively to compel members of the international community to
adopt or not to adopt certain courses of action. An example would be the
pressure that was exerted on the U.S.A. to withdraw from its involvement
in Vietnam.)
Paragraph 37 of the 1979 Review provides:
While observance of the Guidelines is voluntary and
not legally enforceable, they carry the weight of a
joint recommendation by OECD governments addressed to
MNEs which represent their firm expectation for MNE
behavior. The Guidelines received the support of
organisations representing the business community, and
a considerable number of major enterprises have
publicly stated their acceptance. The Guidelines are
also being used as a point of reference by workers'
organisations. 24
Paragraph 24 states:
There appears to be a general willingness on the part
of multinational enteprises to apply the Guidelines
and, although the present Review is taking place a
relatively short time since these instruments were
adopted, a process of acceptance and use of the
Guidelines is under way.25
6. Further Means of Giving Effect to the Declaration
Furthermore, when one considers the other likely ways in which the
Declaration could gain effectiveness, it is possible to compare it
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broadly to a resolution adopted by an international organisation and
compare its effectiveness to that of a resolution, for most resolutions
suffer from the same disadvantages that the Declaration suffers from with
regard to implementation. Unlike treaties or decisions properly adopted
by such organisations, resolutions, prima facie, could not be said to
possess an extensive degree of legal force.
It is very likely that resolutions are not the result of detailed and
scholarly examination and they may have been prompted by purely political
or emotive factors. (There is also no guarantee of the timeliness or the
practicability of resolutions passed by such organisations). However,
there is a tendency, in recent times, to be very careful in the drafting
of resolutions and to accommodate the widest possible spectrum of opinion
in them.
Referring to resolutions of the General Assembly, in the South-West
Africa Case, Judge Lauterpacht observed that they are generally not of a
legal character and therefore do not create legal obligations. However,
he proceeded to qualify his position by stating:
In some matters - such as the election of the
Secretary-General, election of the members of the
Economic and Social Council and some members of the
Trusteeship Council, the adoption of rules of
procedure, admission to, suspension from and
termination of membership, and approval of the budget
and the apportionment of expenses - the full legal
effects of the Resolutions of the General Assembly are
undeniable.26
To this list Johnson adds (inter alia) the following matters which could
be given legal effect through the medium of resolutions:
Responsibilities for the discharge of the economic and
social functions of the United Nations under Articles
60 and 66 of the Charter and the approval of
agreements between the Economic and Social Council and
the specialised agencies.27
It might also be argued that some resolutions of the General
Assembly, which have been passed unanimously, are at least indicative of
currently prevailing international custom. Some of the more significant
resolutions of this category are the ones on outer-space, the sea bed,
expenses incurred by the U.N. and the definition of aggression.28
It is possible to state that a resolution carries some effect when it is
addressed to the internal organs or office bearers of an organisation,
when a previous agreement among the parties had determined that a
particular resolution would be binding on them and where a resolution is
detailed, carefully considered and unanimously adopted, for in the latter
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event it might acquire a de facto effect although it might initially not
possess a de jure effect. Although, basically, a declaration might lack
a formal legal effect, it is possible in some cases for it to acquire a
de facto legal effect.
Broadly speaking, it could be said of the Declarations of the U.N.
General Assembly that,
[djeclarations are solemn resolutions of the General
Assembly which in most cases has only the power to
make recommendations but not decisions (except on some
matters like the United Nations' household).
In view of the greater solemnity and significance of a
"declaration", it may be considered to impart, on
behalf of the organ adopting it, a strong expectation
that Members of the international community will abide
by it. Consequently, in so far as the expectation is
gradually justified by State practice, a declaration
may by custom become recognized as laying down rules
binding upon States. In conclusion, it may be said
that in United Nations practice, a "declaration" is a
solemn instrument resorted to only in very rare cases
relating to matters of major and lasting importance
where maximum compliance is expected.29
Declarations will usually have a greater influence, even if they are
not legally binding. Their solemnity indicates a stronger desire of the
organisation to see them observed. Non-observance will lead to almost
the same political reproaches as non-observance of binding decisions.
Declarations usually influence the further development of the law, both
customary and codified. In this respect it is noted that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights has had a great impact on many national
constitutions, e.g. Rwanda and Somalia. 30 It has sometimes even been
pleaded before national courts. The Court of Appeal of Milan stated that
"The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a source of international
law since its provisions constitute generally recognized rules of
international law."'31 It has been referred to in later declarations of
the U.N. as if it were binding law.32
Likewise, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples has been referred to in more than one hundred
subsequent resolutions. To supervise the implementation of this
Declaration, the General Assembly of the U.N. created a special committee
(the Special Committee of 24).33
Following are some of the significant U.N. Declarations which have
been recited in other declarations and resolutions and which have had a
widespread impact: Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Declaration on
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in Domestic Affairs of
States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty;
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Declaration on Social Progress and Development; Declaration of Principles
Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor; Declaration of the Indian
Ocean as a Zone of Peace; Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded
Persons; Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency
and Armed Conflict; Declaration on the Use of Scientific and
Technological Progress in the Interests of Peace and for the Benefit of
Mankind.
In the light of the above discussion, it could be argued that where a
declaration has been adopted unanimously, the relevant states-parties
might proceed to give effect to its provisions voluntarily, even though
they are not legally bound to do so. This might, in addition to abiding
by its requirements internationally, even include adopting requisite
municipal legislation and administrative measures to give effect to the
declaration within the relevant States. With regard to the OECD
Declaration, it could be said that there has been a general acceptance of
the principles contained in it (partly manifested by its unanimous
adoption) by the relevant states-parties, and a higher degree of
pressure, internationally and domestically, on states to enforce and
further strengthen them, will act as a compelling factor on such states
to implement its provisions to a greater extent.
The provisions of the Declaration relating to national treatment are
of immediate interest. These provisions require foreign-controlled
enterprises to be afforded treatment no less favourable than that
accorded in like situations to domestic enterprises. States are also
expected to endeavour to ensure that even their national subdivisions
treat foreign-controlled enterprises likewise. If the Declaration
acquires a de facto force, Member countries will be required to make a
strenuous attempt to give effect to these provisions. National treatment
of foreign-controlled enterprises is an extremely sensitive issue at
present as various countries beset by extensive economic pressures, have
resorted to different degrees of economic nationalism in recent times and
have subjected foreign-controlled enterprises to a variety of special
requirements. These requirements might relate to taxation, official aids
and subsidies, real-estate matters, access to bank credit and the capital
market, government purchasing, exploitation of mineral resources civil
aviation, banking and finance, media, agriculture, fishing, etc.34 If
the principles contained in the Declaration acquire a de facto force, it
could be expected that in due course suitable national measures will have
to be adopted to ensure that the relevant domestic laws and regulations
accord with the principles contained in the Declaration.
A trend in this direction is discernible from the 1979 Review of the
Decision on National Treatment for Foreign Controlled Enterprises. With
relation to tax obligations, fifteen Member countries indicated that they
did not apply any less favourable treatment to foreign-controlled
enterprises. Seven countries indicated that they still had provisions
requiring differential treatment of foreign-controlled branches, special
taxes on the transfer of real estate and special rules for non-nationals
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on tax evasion; e.g., Canada and New Zealand levied special taxes on the
transfer of real estate to non-residents and foreign-controlled
enterprises. With regard to official aids and subsidies, thirteen
countries indicated that there were no special requirements relating to
foreign-controlled enterprises. However, nine countries continued to
have discriminatory practices in this area. Most such exceptions
referred to grants or loans on preferential terms in specific sectors
such as agriculture, fisheries, films and shipbuilding. With regard to
access to bank credits and the capital market, fourteen Member countries
did not have any discriminatory practices. The others had different
varieties of practices which discriminated against foreign-controlled
enterprises; e.g., in Ireland, U.K. and Finland the government retained a
broad discretionary power to impose restrictions in this area. In the
area of government purchasing and public contracts, thirteen countries
did not have any more restrictions. The others continued to have
discriminatory practices relating to a number of matters. Austria,
France, Netherlands, Switzerland and the United States positively
discriminated against foreign-controlled enterprises in the area of
defence. With regard to investment, only Ireland and Luxembourg had no
exceptions.
The 1979 Review of the Guidelines states at paragraph 110:
Sectoral exceptions are most commonly used in fields
relating to public utilities and public services.
Such areas are, in general, closely regulated by
governments in order to assure the normal functioning
of certain basic activities of predominant national
interest (cf., transports, telecommunications,
broadcasting, energy generation). In this respect the
picture of sectors open to investment by
foreign-controlled enterprises may be incomplete, as
public monopolies are not covered by the notifications
.... Other sectors like mining and manufacturing
industries, banking and insurance are of more
significant importance to international investment.
In these fields relatively few countries have reported
exceptions, and those reported are of varying degrees
of intensity. 35
In retrospect, it might be asserted that despite their lack of legal
force, the provisions of the Declaration (at least in some areas) are
being given effect in actual fact by the Member countries. This might be
the result of the states concerned complying with the moral pressure to
which they are being subjected. It could also be that they are
voluntarily giving effect to certain principles to which they agreed by
common accord. However, what is significant is that a serious effort is
being made to give effect to the accords entered into by the Members
(except Turkey) of the OECD.
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An important means by which a declaration (or resolution) might
acquire the force of international law is by the relevant provisions
becoming part of international custom. This is not an uncommon feature
in international law. However, this process generally takes a long
period of time and might require extensive judicial and academic analysis
before the relevant principles crystallise. This phenomenon has occurred
in other areas of international significance. The developments under the
Universal Postal Union and the International Maritime Consultative
Organisation Agreements are good examples.
Under the U.P.U. Convention, the principle of inviolability and
secrecy of correspondence has evolved although it has not been
incorporated in the provisions of the Convention. It has remained an
extra-treaty principle. In 1919, the U.P.U. Congress in Buenos Aires
adopted the resolution that, "[s]ubject to exceptions provided in Article
46, no item of correspondence, open or closed, can be submitted to any
control or seized." Further, the universal acceptance of the principle
of free access to foreign harbours and the non-discriminatory treatment
of vessels in such harbours has been described as a commonly accepted
usage that has developed under the I.M.C.O. Constitution.36
On the other hand, it is also possible that a declaration or
resolution evidences currently prevailing custom. Although it cannot be
asserted with certainty that the Declaration and the Guidelines are
representative of current practice, there is every likelihood of their
becoming evidence of practices that might evolve into firm rules of
conduct in the future.
However, a significant stumbling block to the development of
international custom on the basis of the above Declaration is that it
consists mainly of recommendations - recommendations to states and to
enterprises. A recommendation involves advice as to the best course or
choice. It imposes no definite obligations. This will hinder the
evolution of definite rights, duties and obligations and could very well
operate to deprive the principles contained in the Declaration of legal
force even in the future.
7. The Need for International Institutions
It is normal practice for States who are party to international
accords to establish international institutions to oversee their due
implementation. This is because international agreements elaborately
drafted and meticulously executed might still not be adequate to deal
with all the questions relating to and arising from the accords already
arrived at, might still contain gaps and might be inadequate to meet
unanticipated contingencies. Hence the need to create international
organisations that possess some form of policy and norm-making power, a
competency to supervise and execute the norms that already exist and the
ability to adjudicate disputes that might arise relating to the accords
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that have been arrived at.
It is noted that the OECD has not sought to establish an
international organisation which will be responsible for performing
functions of the above nature in relation to the Declaration. Of course,
it is possible to argue that a Declaration does not require an
institutional framework to ensure its implementation. However, this is a
shortcoming, perhaps deliberate, and will, no doubt, inhibit the
evolution of the principles contained in the Declaration and the
development of further guidelines and also prevent the growth of an
authority that would oversee the due implementation of the above
principles.
The Declaration mildly hints that organs of this nature might be
created in the future. The preamble refers to the possibility of further
international arrangements and agreements in this field and one could
perhaps expect further more elaborate steps to be taken in the future.
(And such steps could include the creation of international institutions
that ensure the due implementation of the accords arrived at.) Article 4
of the Guidelines also recommends the full use of the bodies established
under the OEMD.
Since the adoption of the Declaration, the OECD Council has been
resorted to for the purpose of enacting three decisions which have been
subsequently revised and which have had a significant impact on the
Declaration. This might indicate a possible way in which institutions
relating to the Declaration and the Declaration itself might evolve. The
OEC Council itself might be relied upon for this purpose. However, this
might not be completely satisfactory as the OECD Council is required to
deal with a wide array of other matters already.
Furthermore, reference is made in the Revised Decision of the Council
on Inter-Governmental Consultation Procedures on the Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises3 7 to the need to hold exchanges of views on
matters related to the Guidelines by the Committee on International
Investment and Multinational Enterprises. This Committee might be a
useful instrument for the purpose of developing a future institutional
structure relating to the Declaration. This is significant due to the
stress placed in the Decision on holding regular exchanges of views.
These exchanges could relate to further principles to be adopted, to
their due application or to the resolution of disputes relating to the
principles that have already been adopted or are sought to be adopted by
the various Member countries. It is possible that with the passage of
time, the Committee would wield more authority in the above areas.
On the other hand, if in due course the principles contained in the
Declaration acquire the force of law (by becoming part of international
custom or through some other means), it might become more expedient to
establish a proper institutional structure for the purpose of ensuring
their due implementation. This is a development which could very well
occur in the future.
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8. Resolution of Disputes
It is noted that the Declaration pays great attention to the
resolution of disputes. It has made a number of references to methods
that could be employed for the purpose. The preamble states,
"Considering that, while continuing endeavours within the OED may lead
to further international arrangements and agreements in this field, it
seems appropriate at this stage to intensify their co-operation and
consultation on issues relating to international investment and
multinational enterprises through inter-related instruments each of which
deals with a different aspect of the matter and together constitute a
framework within which the OECD will consider these issues."'38 This
points to a way in which disputes might be resolved, i.e. through further
co-operation and consultation and through the conclusion of further
accords. (These are methods which are commonly used for the resolution
of international disputes.) The great advantage of co-operation and
consultation is that States who disagree with each other on the
interpretation of a provision in an international accord, or the
realisation of a common objective, could utilise these methods to explore
each other's views in an easy atmosphere with the view to achieving a
mutually acceptable solution before the dispute crystallized and reached
a stage when a solution would be more difficult to achieve. These
methods also enable them to continue the search for a solution away from
a critical public gaze. They enable parties to arrive at solutions that
are generally acceptable to all interested parties, avoid premature
public criticism and desist from harmful public posturing. It could be
said that a wide resort to co-operation and consultation could enable
disputes to be resolved amicably and would also result in the gradual
evolution of the principles contained in the Declaration. Furthermore,
this would help to ensure that the solutions reached are implemented by
the parties concerned.
The need to conduct consultations for the resolution of disputes
relating to the Declaration or the Decisions might even give rise to a
need for an institution which would facilitate such consultations. Such
an institution could also provide the wide range of back-up facilities (a
secretariat, research facilities, expert assistance, etc.) that are
generally required for the purpose.
It is possible that the parties to the Declaration are acknowledging
through the preamble that the principles contained in the Declaration
might evolve into internationally binding norms of conduct in the future
and, hence, adequate opportunities are required to be left for the
interested states-parties to contribute to this evolution through
consultations and negotiations.
It is also interesting that the above provision acknowledges that
further international arrangements and agreements might be made in this
field.
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In this connection, it is noted that the Committee on International
Investment and Multinational Enterprises observed in the 1979 Review:
With respect to specific matters arising under the
Guidelines the Committee urges that such matters first
be raised, discussed, and, if possible, resolved at
the national level and, when appropriate, such efforts
be pursued at the bilateral level. Where issues
related to the Guidelines are identified by
governments and/or one of the advisory bodies, the
matter may be raised with the Committee. The
Committee is proposing that the above mentioned
Decision be further amended to state specifically that
the Committee shall be responsible for clarification
Of the Guidelines. The Committee notes its intention
to respond in a timely manner to further requests for
clarification. Where such responses are possible,
they will be given to the interested parties, as
appropriate, through informal contacts or in the
context of formal consultations with the advisory
bodies as well as in the eriodic Reports of the
Committee to the Council.
This indicates a possible way in which the institutional structure under
the Declaration could evolve.
Article IV of the Declaration states that "they [the governments of
OECO Member countries] are prepared to consult one another on the above
matters in conformity with Decisions of the Council relating to
Inter-Governmental Consultation Procedures on the Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises, on National Treatment and on International
Investment Incentives and Disincentives." Article 4 of the Guidelines
states that "within the Organisation, the programme of co-operation to
attain these ends will be a continuing, pragmatic and balanced one."
The above attitude manifested in the Declaration and the Guidelines
is further emphasised in Article 11 of the Guidelines which states that
Member countries have agreed to establish appropriate
review and consultation procedures concerning issues
arising in respect of the guidelines. When
multinational enterprises are made subject to
conflicting requirements by Member countries, the
governments concerned will co-operate in good faith
with a view to resolving such problems either within
the Committee for International Investment and
Multinational Enterprises established by the OECD
Council on 21 January 1975 or through other mutually
acceptable arrangements.40
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The importance of co-operation and consultation is stressed in the
three Decisions adopted by the OECD Council. The Committee on
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises is not only
required to hold regular exchanges of views, it is empowered even to
invite the Business and Industry Advisory Committee and the Trade Union
Advisory Committee to express their views. It could even give an
individual enterprise the opportunity to state its sentiments. However,
it is significant that the Committee itself is prohibited from expressing
its judgment.
The Committee is also empowered to hold consultations relating to
complaints on the question of "National Treatment" and on the complaint
of a Member that its interests are being adversely affected by the impact
on the flow of international direct investments by measures taken by
another Member country specifically designed to provide incentives or
disincentives for international direct investment.
These provisions seem further to strengthen the view that despite the
absence of strictly binding norms of conduct, a clear-cut institutional
framework and a definite dispute resolving organ, the OECD has opted to
stress the importance of co-operation and consultation for the purpose of
achieving its objectives and resolving disputes in relation to the
Declaration.
It is also interesting to note that from the beginning, reference was
made to the possibility of relying on the Committee for International
Investment and Multinational Enterprises of the OECD for the purpose of
resolving disputes. The procedure adopted by this Committee is not very
clear. However, it makes detailed studies, provides opportunities for
interested parties to express their views and generally helps them to
arrive at solutions that are acceptable to the parties. Thus, the final
result of its functions would also be similar to arriving at a solution
through a process of co-operation and consultations.
The 1979 Review observed in paragraph 13:
The IME Committee's review of the instruments on
National Treatment for foreign-controlled enterprises,
which is the subject of Chapter II, shows that
progress has been made in strengthening international
co-operation in this important aspect of the
international investment climate. In particular,
Member governments have co-operated in reporting
measures which exist in their countries which
constitute exceptions to National Treatment and in
explaining the nature of such exceptions and how they
are applied in practice. As a result of the work
completed to date by the Committee, a notably greater
degree of transparency with respect to exceptions to
National Treatment has been achieved, particularly-
those exceptions which are formalised in the laws and
regulations of.Member countries.41
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It also observed in paragraph 15:
[t~he Committee notes that no country has availed
itself, since 1976, of the possibility for formal
consultations on a matter related to this instrument
but believes the existence of such a facility in the
Decision provides an important safeguard for Member
countries. ''42
Despite the fact that no Member country sought consultations on a
matter that was adversely affecting the inflow of international direct
investment (as provided for by the relevant decision in 1976), the
Revised Decision of the Council on International Investment Incentives
and Disincentives also provided for the above Committee to be the forum
for any necessary consultations. Article 1 states,
Consultations will take place in the framework of the
Committee on International Investment and
Multinational Enterprises at the request of a Member
country which considers that its interests may be
adversely affected by the impact on its flow of
international direct investments of measures taken by
another Member country specifically designed to
provide incentives or disincentives for international
direct investment. Having full regard to the national
economic objectives of the measures and without
prejudice to policies designed to redress regional
imbalances, the purpose of the consultations will be
to examine the possibility of reducing such effects to
a minimum.43
Similarly, no country made use of paragraph 5 of the Decision on
National Treatment which provided for the Committee to act as a forum for
consultations "at the request of a Member country, in respect of any
matter related to this instrument and its implementation, including
exceptions to National Treatment and their application." The revised
Decision provides in Article 6: "The Committee shall act as a forum for
consultations, at the request of a Member country, in respect of any
matter related to this instrument and its implementation, including
exceptions to 'National Treatment' and their application."'44 A similar
provision is to be found in Article 1 of the Revised Decision on
Inter-governmental Consultation Procedures on the Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises.45
It would appear from the above that in the area of dispute resolution
there is evidence of the gradual evolution of the IME Committee as a body
which would specialise in resolving conflicts. The Committee still is
imperfect in a number of respects. However, it is possible that in time
its authority will grow despite the fact that it has not been used
extensively by the parties up to now.
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The Guidelines make provision for the use of existing machinery
within the OECD for the purpose of achieving the objects of the
Organisation. Article 4 states that, "[w]ithin the Organisation, the
program of co-operation to attain these ends will be a continuing,
pragmatic and balanced one. It comes within the general aims of the
convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) and makes full use of the various specialised bodies of the
Organisation, whose terms of reference already cover many aspects of the
role of multinational enterprises .... " This provision enables parties
to rely on existing machinery within the Organisation for the purpose of
resolving differences and to co-operate for the purpose of attaining the
ends of the Declaration. The Article goes on to state:
In these bodies, work is being carried out on the
identification of issues, the improvement of relevant
qualitative and statistical information and the
elaboration of proposals for action designed to
strengthen inter-governmental co-operation. In some
of these areas procedures already exist through which
issues related to the operations of multinational
enterprises can be taken up. This work could result
in the conclusion of further and complementary
agreements and arrangements between governments.46
The OECD has established a number of committees which are extensively
involved in work that is relevant to the realisation of the objectives of
the Declaration. (This is in addition to the Secretariat which is also
involved in such work.) There are the Economic Policy Committee,
Economic and Development Review Committee, Committee for Energy Policy,
Development Assistance Committee, Technical Co-operation Committee, Trade
Committee, Manpower and Social Affairs Committee, Environment Committee,
Committee for Scientific and Technological Policy, Industry Committee,
Nuclear Energy Agency and other such organs.
The Guidelines also provide in Article 10 for the use of existing
international dispute settlement mechanisms, including arbitration, as a
means of facilitating the resolution of problems arising between
enterprises and Member countries.
It would thus appear from the examination of the above provisions
that though there is an absence of specific provisions setting up a major
dispute settlement organ for the purpose of dealing with disputes
relating to the Declaration and the attendant instruments, there are a
number of provisions which deal with the question of dispute resolution.
Despite the obvious handicap posed by the absence of definite
commitments, rights and obligations in the Declaration, it (perhaps in
the expectation that one day developments lending substance to its
provisions might occur) does provide for the utilisation of some already
popular methods for the resolution of disputes, namely, co-operation and
consultation, use of existing machinery, conclusion of additional accords
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and the use of existing international dispute settlement machinery.
Co-operation and consultation, which are methods that are extensively
relied upon by nations for the settlement of disputes today, are
particularly suited for resolving disputes under the Declaration due to
its very elementary nature and due to the need to secure mutually
acceptable solutions to any problem if such solutions are to be
implemented at all.
9. Preliminary Conclusions
With regard to the international implementation of the provisions of
the Declaration, it is now possible to make certain general comments.
Due to the fact that the Declaration and its attendant instruments
consist mainly of recommendations (with all the inherent shortcomings
that are associated with recommendations) and due to the fact that they
have been largely deprived of legal effect, it will be difficult to give
them a high degree of effectiveness in the immediate future. However,
there is every possibility that with the passage of time, due to the
factors discussed above, the principles expressed in the Declaration will
take a more concrete form and will constitute international rights,
duties and obligations relating to the subject matter. As the Review of
1979 concluded, already there are indications of a growth in this
direction. Similarly, even though today there are no specific
institutions of any significance for the realisation of the objectives of
the Declaration, it is possible that, with the evolution of the
principles contained in the Declaration, such institutions will be
developed in the future. It is noted that in relation to the resolution
of disputes and disagreements there already exists an elementary
framework which could be resorted to and improved upon. If in time the
principles contained in the Declaration take a more concrete form, this
framework might evolve into something more significant, or new
institutions may have to be created to cater to the new needs.
10. Implementation within Member-States
The next question of significance associated with the realisation of
the objectives of the Declaration relates to the implementation of its
provisions within the municipal legal systems of the Member countries of
the OECD. It is usually necessary to take appropriate steps to ensure
that the international obligations which States enter into are duly given
effect within the municipal legal systems of countries. This is
specifically significant in the case of obligations (like some of the
obligations contained in the Declaration) of an economic nature due to
the extensive impact that they tend to have on a variety of internal
laws, regulations, customs and practices, on the lives and livelihood of
individual persons and on legal persons. This becomes important also for
the reason that multinationals are organised and operate both
internationally and within countries. It is to be remembered that
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internal administrative and judicial authorities which are the
instrumentalities through which laws and regulations have to be given
effect within a country, will normally give effect only to norms that are
recognised as legally binding by a particular municipal legal system. An
internal legal system will contain its own specific requirements which
need to be satisfied before a norm is accepted as binding by the internal
administrative and legal authorities.
The Review of 1979 observes in paragraph 53:
It is recognised that guidelines dealing with
complex legal and economic concepts, such as abuse of
a dominant position, adverse effects on competition
and unreasonably differentiated pricing policies, are
not sufficient in themselves to provide precise rules
for business executives to follow in specific
circumstances. Under the national law of various
Countries, these concepts have been given meaning
through interpretation by the competent tribunals.
This is why supporting action by Member governments at
national level is needed, together with complementary
arrangements and agreements for inter-governmental
co-operation.47
If an international norm is to become part of a municipal legal system,
it will have to be introduced into it in accordance with the procedures
specified for the making of norms of conduct within such a municipal
legal system. These procedures might include complying with
constitutional and other legal requirements relating to ratification and
acceptance, acceptance by Parliament, publication in a specified medium,
enactment of specific legislation, enactment of specific regulations and
other similar measures.
11. The Introduction of International Norms into Municipal Jurisdictions
Different countries adopt different means for the introduction of
international norms of conduct into their national legal systems. Under
Article 6 of Clause 2 of the Constitution of the U.S.A., treaties are
required to be made by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(Once this is done such treaties normally acquire the status of municipal
law, 48 and become, along with the Constitution and Acts of Congress,
"The Supreme Law of the Land.")
In Britain and in most Commonwealth countries international norms
become part of the municipal legal system only if such norms are
specifically introduced by legislation.49
In France Article 53 of the Constitution provides: "Peace treaties,
commercial treaties, treaties and agreements relating to international
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organisations, those that imply a commitment for finances of the State,
those that modify provisions of a legal nature, those that relate to the
status of persons, those that call for the cession, exchange or addition
of territories may be ratified or approved only by a law." In fact,
French courts have tended to recognize only those agreements which have
been published in the form of presidential decrees., 0
In view of the above, if the provisions of the Declaration are to be
properly introduced into the municipal legal systems of Member countries
and duly given effect, the above requirements will have to be complied
with; i.e., they will have to be introduced in accordance with the
constitutional and other legal requirements.
A very serious problem in implementing the above Declaration within
Member countries stems from its very nature. Since the guidelines
consist only of recommendations, they lack substance and hence would be
difficult to be introduced into the national legal systems with great
effectiveness. (It is always easier to introduce specific provisions.)
Furthermore, due to the fact that the Guidelines are imprecise and
broadly drafted, they would be subjected to various interpretations by
the national authorities who are seeking to introduce them. The
consequences of this would be that even if these Guidelines are
implemented within Member countries, they would tend to be introduced and
then implemented in different ways and there would be little consistency
among the countries that are seeking to implement them.
Where a principle contained in the Declaration is presented to an
appropriate internal organ for the purpose of its being accepted in the
proper manner in accordance with the prescribed constitutional and legal
requirements (in order to confer on it the force of law), it is likely
that numerous internal pressure groups will strive to leave their imprint
on it. Thus, there will be the groups representing the multinationals
who will seek to ensure that the principle that is adopted by the
internal organ will be reflective if their interests, while consumer or
public interest groups will strive to ensure that their interests are
reflected in the norms that are adopted. There will also be groups
representing the lobbies which seek to protect national business
interests. Thus, the norms that will eventually be adopted might be
reflective of the interests of domestic pressure groups rather than of
the objectives which were sought to be achieved by the draftsman of the
Declaration. The imprecise nature of the recommendations will result in
such norms' (when they are adopted into the municipal legal system) being
particularly reflective of the interests of the dominant domestic
pressure groups. (This is particularly true of the way in which the
Decision on National Treatment of Foreign-Controlled Enterprises has been
implemented in different Member countries. It is seen that the same
matter is not regulated in an identical manner in the different
countries.)
The above state of affairs has caused the provisions of the
Declaration to be implemented in a variety of ways with varying effects.
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12. Need to Comply with Internal Legal Requirements
It is also noted that the Declaration takes cognisance of the
internal requirements of Member countries when they give effect to it.
Article II(1) refers to the need to be conscious of a Member country's
needs to maintain public order, to protect essential security interests
and to fulfil commitments relating to international peace and security in
according national treatment to multinational enterprises. Thus, the
obligation to accord national treatment to such enterprises is subject to
certain internal requirements of Member countries.
It appears that it is compatible with the Declaration to accord a
higher priority to the above considerations in implementing its
provisions within a Member country. According to the Interim Report of
the Committee on Exceptions to National Treatment51 most OECD countries
maintain exceptions in areas related to defence, operation of flag
vessels, air and maritime transportation, aircraft and aeronautics, radio
and T.V. broadcasting, banking and insurance, mining and oil
explorations, hydro power and nuclear energy, real estate and ports.
13. Impact of Contradictory Domestic Laws
This also brings up another very important question. This relates to
the problem raised by the existence of contradictory domestic laws,
regulations, etc. in a Member country that is seeking to implement the
Declaration internally by having it accepted in the appropriate manner by
the legislature.
In some countries, e.g., the U.S.A., the constitution is supreme and
if the provisions that are introduced happen to contravene the
Constitution, the latter would prevail. In the case of other laws, the
principle which operates is that "the latter in time prevails."
Therefore, when a provision of the Declaration is sought to be introduced
into a domestic jurisdiction of this nature, care should be taken to
ensure that it does not contravene constitutional provisions and if it
does contravene other legislative provisions, to ensure that it is
clearly and unambiguously to prevail.
In the British Commonwealth international obligations of this nature
have to be specifically introduced into national jurisdictions and the
later in time prevails (except where a constitution provision states
otherwise).
It is very likely that there would already be extensive provisions in
the domestic laws of Member countries which have a bearing on matters
covered by the Declaration. There could be laws dealing with foreign
investments, takeovers, taxation, import and export control, exchange
control, ownership of property, labour laws, quarantine, environmental
considerations, etc. These laws might in some instances conflict with
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the provisions of the Declaration, e.g., the Australian provisions on the
ownership of certain sectors of the economy. 52 These local laws are
enforced by the domestic administrative and judicial organs; and, if they
are to enforce the provisions of the Declaration, not only will it be
necessary for such provisions to be introduced into the municipal legal
system in such a manner as to confer on them the quality of law, but also
they should not conflict with the Constitution. Furthermore, when such
provisions are introduced, they should clearly override existing national
laws on the matter sought to be legislated upon.
14. Needs of Other Member Countries
The provisions contained in the Declaration seem to indicate that
Member countries have also acknowledged the need to be sensitive to the
interests of each other in the implementation of its provisions. This
might also mean that they are required to be careful about not enacting
laws which are in obvious conflict with the laws of other Member
countries. Article 111(2) of the Declaration states, "that they thus
recognise the need to give due weight to the interests of Member
countries affected by specific laws, regulations and administrative
practices in this field (hereinafter called 'measures') providing
official incentives and disincentives to international direct
investment." If this provision is adhered to, it is possible to envisage
an evolution which would result in the harmonising of the laws of the
different States in this particular area. This will also be conducive to
introducing a degree of harmony in the relevant areas of economic
activity.
Article 111(3) goes on to stress the need to make such internal
measures as transparent as possible. This, in addition to facilitating
their examination and appreciation by enterprises, also enables other
Member countries to be aware of their existence and to avoid
contradicting them consciously or unwittingly.
15. Effect of the Principles Relating to International Custom
Another way in which the provisions of the Declaration might be given
effect within municipal jurisdictions is through their becoming part of
international custom. (This, as was pointed out earlier, is a slow and
uncertain process.) This is because most municipal legal systems
recognise international custom and give effect to it in the most
appropriate manner. There is also a general presumption that municipal
laws are not intended to contradict international custom.53 Where an
international custom exists and where it is not directly in conflict with
statute law, internal administrative and judicial organs tend to apply
such a custom within municipal legal systems in a sympathetic manner.
A further aid to the internal implementation of international norms
is their adoption by internal bodies -- particularly the professional
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bodies. Thus the adoption of the principles expressed in the provisions
of the Declaration by the legal fraternity, (or by the accountants' body)
as appropriate standards, will go a long way towards their eventual
enforcement through the instrumentalities of the internal legal system,
for international standards which are acceded to by the internal
professional bodies will generally find ready acceptance by the members
of such bodies.
16. The Actual Practices of Governments
From the actual performance of individual governments, it will appear
that extensive efforts have been made by them to give effect to the
provisions of the Declaration and the Decisions within their municipal
legal systems.
Paragraph 79 of the 1979 Review states, in relation to publicizing
the provisions of the Declaration:
Member governments which have not already done so
will provide facilities for handling enquiries and for
discussions with the parties concerned on matters
relating to the Guidelines. They intend to inform the
business community, employee organisations and other
interested parties of the appropriate contact point(s)
within the government for enquiries on matters related
to the Guidelines. The Committee believes that such
facilities, existing examples of which are listed in
Annex I, could usefully contribute to the solution of
problems relating to the Guidelines which may arise
and that, in any event, as a general principle such
prior contacts and discussions at the national level
should take place before matters are raised at the
international level.54
In most countries, the Guidelines have been widely distributed to all
ministries and public organisations concerned. The Declaration of 1976
has been brought to the knowledge of the general public in Australia,
Canada, Denmark, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Germany and the United States (by
means of official press releases or press briefings and/or through its
insertion in official publications). In the United Kingdom, the
Guidelines were published in a white paper with a foreword by the
Secretary of State for Industry. In Portugal, the Declaration and the
Decisions were published in the Official Gazette. In the United States,
the Declaration and Secretary Kissinger's statement before the OECD
Council were published in the Jly 1976 edition of the Department of
State Bulletin. In Switzerland, the Declaration was published in the
Official Gazette as an annex to the 7th Report of the Federal Council on
Foreign Economic Policy and submitted to Parliament in August 1976. In
Sweden, the Government notified the public of the Declaration and
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Decisions by means of an ordinance published in the Swedish Book of
Statutes. In Australia, the 1977 Report of the Foreign Investment Review
Board as well as the government's revised foreign investment policy
issued in 1978 drew attention to the Guidelines and issued the
Declaration in full as an attachment.
In all Member countries, the Guidelines have been extensively
distributed to the business community, labour unions, professional
federations, chambers of commerce and individual companies (for instance
in Japan 5,000 private enterprises received the Guidelines from the
Government, which distributed ten thousand pamphlets explaining the
Guidelines in detail). They have been made available either in the OECD
version (English or French) or translated into a foreign language
(Danish, Dutch, Finnish, German, Japanese, Norwegian and Swedish). The
booklet was often accompanied by an official foreword requesting the
parties to bring the contents of the Guidelines to the attention of those
of its members which are multinational enterprises and urging their
observance of the Guidelines or stressing the need for the enterprises to
comply with the Guidelines. Finally, some Member countries sent letters
to individual enterprises informing them of the Declaration and
commending the Guidelines to them. In the United States such a letter,
jointly written by the Secretaries of State, Treasury and Commerce, has
been sent to more than 800 chief executive officers of major U.S.
corporations. In Germany, the Federal Minister of Economics sent a
communication to the business organisations and unions concerned. This
communication was also published. In Austria, the same addressees
received a letter from the Federal Minister of Trade, Commerce and
Industry. In the United Kingdom, the Secretary of State for Trade has
written to the heads of the major City institutions, such as the Stock
Exchange.
Some Member countries have taken steps to bring the Guidelines to the
attention of their enterprises operating abroad through official or
non-official channels. In Denmark, the Declaration has been distributed
to all embassies and missions abroad. In Italy, the Declaration and
Decisions have been sent to all members (more than 5,000) of the Italian
Section of the International Chamber of Commerce. In Japan, the
Government has taken necessary steps to communicate the instruments to
the embassies in the countries where Japanese companies are operating.
The United States Ambassador to the OECD undertook an intensive programme
to brief United States businessmen in OECD countries.
Among the Member countries which have arrangements for regular
discussions with the interested parties on matters relating to the
Guidelines may be mentioned the following: the Canadian Government has
had exchanges of views from time to time with the Canadian business and
labour communities on the application of the 1976 instruments. In the
United States, the Department of State has a Public Advisory Committee on
Transnational Enterprises by which issues arising under the instruments
are discussed. In Sweden, Norway and Finland, interministerial groups
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with the participation of business and labour organisations have been
established to co-ordinate the participation of each of these countries
in the OED work on multinational enterprises; representatives of MNEs
operating in Norway and Sweden have been invited to participate in these
discussions. In Australia, the Foreign Investment Review Board held
discussions about the Guidelines with some of the major organisations
representing foreign enterprises in Australia. In the Netherlands, an
interministerial group discusses regularly with business and labour
organisations all relevant matters with respect to the 1976 instruments.
In Germany, officials hold regular exchanges of views with the business
community on the same matters. In Switzerland, regular contacts were
established between the federal authorities and the interested parties in
the course of the negotiations on the 1976 instruments; these contacts
have been pursued with respect to the application of the instruments. In
Austria, the Federal Minister for Trade, Commerce and Industry has made
contact with the Federal Chamber of Trade and Industry and employees' and
workers' organisations with a view to providing the OECD in due course
with information on the Austrian experience in applying the Guidelines.
In the United Kingdom, the Divisions of the Department of Industry
responsible for individual sectors of industry are discussing the
Guidelines with companies in the normal course of their dealings with
them. In Japan, Government officials have also held meetings and
conferences to provide further clarifications of the Guidelines and to
answer any questions which groups or individuals may have.
Some Member governments have used one or more of the Guidelines in
the context of national policies. The American and the Swedish
Governments have referred to the Guidelines on competition policy when
dealing with restrictive business practices involving activities of
multinational companies in other countries. The Netherlands Government
has on various occasions stated that it takes into account the relevant
Guidelines when determining its policies. The Australian Government has
incorporated the Guidelines as an integral part of its policy on inward
foreign investment, has indicated publicly that it wishes foreign
interests operating in Australia to observe them and uses them as points
of reference in the examination of applications submitted to the
Government under its foreign investment policy.
17. Conclusions
In conclusion, it may be said that the implementation of the
Declaration within municipal legal systems could pose difficult problems
due to the very nature of the Declaration -- its lack of certainty and
substance and the absence of too many definite rights and obligations.
Substance and certainty could be lent to it by enacting legislation and
adopting administrative measures (as appropriate) to enforce the basic
principles contained in them. This method, of course, runs the risk of
the Declarations being given effect in a variety of different ways within
Member countries. (This has happened already.) The introduction of the
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Declaration in this manner into municipal legal systems will also require
the involvement of the administrative and judicial organs of the State to
an extensive degree in this process.
It has been seen that extensive administrative measures have already
been taken to give effect to the provisions of the Declaration. The
enthusiasm that has been displayed up to now augurs well for the success
of the Declaration and the Guidelines. A continuation of this process
could result in these being given effect in a more substantive manner
within the municipal legal systems of Member countries.
The successful implementation of the Declaration both internationally
and internally is an encouraging portent for the success of other
interational economic agreements as well. If the objectives of the
Declaration, despite all its shortcomings, are capable of being
satisfactorily fulfilled, many of the other agreements should pose less
of a problem. At a time when countries are seeking to give effect to
numerous international economic agreements which have the objective of
regulating vast areas of economic activity, not only affecting nations in
their international relations, but also numerous individual persons
within countries, such an outcome would be welcomed by the world
community as it could possibly hasten the advent of an orderly rule -
oriented international economic regulatory system.
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